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factors, such as behavior, morphology, and testing proce-
dures, rather than cognitive deficiencies. We also present 
insight into previously undocumented challenges that should 
better inform future Aesop’s Fable studies incorporating 
more diverse taxa.
Keywords Causal understanding · Tool use · Choice 
task · Innovation · Problem solving · Carnivora
Introduction
To understand how and why cognition has evolved across 
the animal kingdom, it is essential to assess cognitive abili-
ties systematically across a wide range of taxa. Achieving 
this goal, however, is one of the more challenging obstacles 
in the field of comparative cognition (Shettleworth 2010). 
Variation in phylogeny, ecology, species-specific traits (e.g., 
behavior, morphology), and logistical considerations (e.g., 
sample size, testing environment) makes meaningful stand-
ardized testing difficult (Auersperg et al. 2012; Thornton and 
Lukas 2012). The development of universal paradigms, or 
standardized tests that can be successfully applied to a wide 
range of species, is a promising method to facilitate inter-
species comparisons. Indeed, universal paradigms, such 
as the string-pulling task (see Jacobs and Osvath 2015 for 
review) and standardized apparatuses, such as single-solu-
tion puzzle boxes (Benson-Amram et al. 2016), have been 
successfully administered to many taxa in the investigation 
of cognitive evolution. Yet the effectiveness of most uni-
versal paradigms has not been fully evaluated. The Aesop’s 
Fable paradigm, proposed to investigate the cognitive ability 
of causal understanding, is one such example.
Coined “Aesop’s Fable” after Aesop’s classic tale of The 
Crow and the Pitcher, this paradigm presents a subject with 
Abstract To gain a better understanding of the evolution 
of animal cognition, it is necessary to test and compare the 
cognitive abilities of a broad array of taxa. Meaningful inter-
species comparisons are best achieved by employing univer-
sal paradigms that standardize testing among species. Many 
cognitive paradigms, however, have been tested in only a 
few taxa, mostly birds and primates. One such example, 
known as the Aesop’s Fable paradigm, is designed to assess 
causal understanding in animals using water displacement. 
To evaluate the universal effectiveness of the Aesop’s Fable 
paradigm, we applied this paradigm to a previously untested 
taxon, the raccoon (Procyon lotor). We first trained cap-
tive raccoons to drop stones into a tube of water to retrieve 
a floating food reward. Next, we presented successful rac-
coons with objects that differed in the amount of water they 
displaced to determine whether raccoons could select the 
most functional option. Raccoons performed differently 
than corvids and human children did in previous studies of 
Aesop’s Fable, and we found raccoons to be innovative in 
many aspects of this task. We suggest that raccoon perfor-
mance in this paradigm reflected differences in tangential 
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a clear cylinder that is partially filled with water. Floating 
on top of the water, inside the cylinder, is a desirable yet 
out-of-reach food reward. To bring the reward within reach, 
the subject must make selections between options that differ 
in functionality, such as objects that will either sink or float. 
If the subject chooses the more functional option (i.e., the 
option that is most effective at raising the water level) sig-
nificantly more often than the less functional options, these 
choices could demonstrate that the subject has causal under-
standing of the physical properties of each option (Jelbert 
et al. 2015). Although general performance on the tasks pre-
sented in Aesop’s Fable varies, corvids have demonstrated 
the ability to correctly discriminate in choice tasks at the 
same level as children ages five to seven (Cheke et al. 2012; 
Jelbert et al. 2015).
The Aesop’s Fable paradigm has been proposed as a uni-
versal assessment of causal understanding across species 
because it is no more ecologically relevant for one species 
than another (e.g., Jelbert et al. 2014; Logan et al. 2014). 
This paradigm, however, has only been tested in birds and 
human children (Logan 2016; Miller et al. 2016). Use of 
similar, established paradigms designed to assess causal 
understanding, such as the trap-tube task (Visalberghi and 
Limongelli 1994) and the floating peanut task (Mendes et al. 
2007), have also been largely constrained to birds and pri-
mates. The limited use of such established paradigms leaves 
two primary gaps in our knowledge as researchers of animal 
cognition: not only are we unaware of causal understanding 
in a broad array of species, but we also do not know if these 
paradigms are appropriate for use outside of birds and pri-
mates. To help address these gaps in knowledge, we applied 
the Aesop’s Fable paradigm to a previously untested taxon, 
the raccoon (Procyon lotor).
Evidence from a small number of studies indicates that 
the general intelligence of raccoons surpasses domestic cats 
(Felis catus), but does not exceed rhesus macaques (Macaca 
mulatta) (e.g., Cole 1907; Davis 1907; but also Vonk and 
Leete 2017 for discussion) and that raccoons demonstrate 
innovative problem solving and behavioral flexibility (Dan-
iels 2016). Furthermore, popular opinion based on anecdotal 
evidence also indicates that raccoons are a clever species 
capable of overcoming novel challenges (e.g., North 1966). 
Given the demonstrated capacity of raccoons for cognitive 
testing, and our basic understanding of their cognitive abili-
ties, we predicted that:
1. Raccoons can learn to drop stones into a tube of water 
to retrieve a floating reward, and therefore the Aesop’s 
Fable paradigm can be applied to carnivorans in addi-
tion to birds and primates.
2. When presented with choices that vary in functional-
ity, raccoons will either select the correct choice at 
the start of trials, demonstrating that they have causal 
understanding or will learn to choose the correct option 
over the course of several trials, indicating that this task 
requires trial-and-error learning.
Subjects and materials
Our study was conducted at the USDA National Wildlife 
Research Center (NWRC) in Fort Collins, CO under proto-
col QA-2490. The raccoons were also part of several other 
protocols at NWRC (QA-2111, QA-2290, QA-2440, and 
QA-2492). Half of the subjects (N = 4) were wild-caught 
adult raccoons brought into captivity for QA-2111 (see John-
son et al. 2016). The other half of the subjects (N = 4) were 
littermates born to a wild-caught mother (not tested) at the 
NWRC and were two years of age at the time of testing. 
Raccoons from both wild-caught and captive-born groups 
comprised an even sex ratio. The Aesop’s Fable apparatus 
consisted of a 0.5-m vertical cylinder of clear polycarbonate 
attached to a 0.5 m × 0.14 m  Arboron® platform base weigh-
ing 11.3 kg. An extended, circular rim measuring 0.19 m 
in diameter added to the top of the tube provided a ledge 
on which to balance stones. We used one marshmallow cut 
into smaller pieces as our floating reward and filled the tube 
with 500 mL of water (± 100 mL depending on the pre-
determined arm length of the individual being tested).
Procedure
Due to time limitations imposed by other protocols, we 
employed a similar, but not identical, procedure used in 
previous Aesop’s Fable studies. In Phase I, each raccoon 
(N = 8) participated in three conditions: initial, learning, 
and final trials. All trials lasted a minimum of 20 min, and 
the number of trials per condition was dependent on the per-
formance of the subject. During initial trials, we presented 
each subject with five stones on the platform of the appa-
ratus to determine if raccoons could solve the task without 
any training (three trials). If the raccoons failed to drop the 
stones into the tube during initial trials, they immediately 
progressed into learning trials for stone-dropping training. 
During learning trials, we stacked and balanced stones on 
the extended rim at the opening of the tube and placed small 
pieces of food on the stones and apparatus for several trials 
(mean trial number = 12.5, range = 10–18 trials). If rac-
coons interacted with the apparatus, the stones would fall 
in accidentally and raise the water level (see video Online 
Resource 1). Raccoons could then form an association 
between the stones falling into the apparatus and the reward 
moving within reach. After learning trials were complete, 
the raccoons entered final trials (mean trial number = 4.5, 
range = 4–8 trials) where they had to pick up stones from 
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the ground and drop them into the tube to retrieve the reward 
(see Fig. 1).
Raccoons that learned to drop stones into the Aesop’s 
Fable apparatus advanced into Phase II, which was com-
prised of four additional tasks: size, substrate, and density 
choice tasks based on previous Aesop’s Fable studies (e.g., 
Bird and Emery 2009; Jelbert et al. 2014), and a novel tool 
use task that we introduced to expand the current Aesop’s 
Fable paradigm with dexterous, long-limbed species (see 
ESM Fig. 1). In the size task (six trials), we presented rac-
coons with a single apparatus and six stones: three large and 
three small. In the substrate task (12 trials), raccoons were 
presented with the same five stones used in Phase I and two 
apparatuses: one containing water and another containing 
corncob litter (see video Online Resource 2). In the den-
sity task (12 trials), we presented raccoons with a single 
apparatus and six small, numbered tennis balls. Three of 
the balls were heavy and would sink when placed in water, 
while the other three were light and would float (see video 
Online Resource 3). Lastly, in the tool use task (12 trials), 
we presented raccoons with a single apparatus and a small, 
steel cup with a handle that could be used to scoop out the 
marshmallow reward (see video Online Resource 4). To 
ensure standardization of procedures, tasks were deployed 
in the following chronological order: size, substrate, tool 
use, and density.
We investigated the processes by which subjects learned 
to drop stones in the apparatus during Phase I by modeling 
the effects of subject ID and trial number on (1) changes in 
work time and (2) changes in exploratory diversity (Benson-
Amram and Holekamp 2012; Chow et al. 2016). We also 
modeled the effect of subject ID and trial number on the pro-
portion of correct versus incorrect choices made across trials 
in Phase II, which would indicate whether raccoons learned 
to select the more functional options with greater experi-
ence. To assess preference for the more functional options 
across tasks, we used exact binomial tests to determine if (1) 
the first choice made in each trial (i.e., the first stone/object 
dropped, or the first apparatus the subject dropped a stone 
into) was correct more often than would be expected by 
chance, and (2) the overall number of correct choices made 
in each trial differed from chance. A detailed description of 
our methods, criteria, and analyses can be found in ESM.
Results
All of the raccoons approached the apparatus in at least 
two trials, and seven of the eight raccoons interacted with 
the experimental materials (e.g., touched and sniffed the 
apparatus, handled the stones). None of the raccoons solved 
Aesop’s Fable in the initial trials. During learning trials, four 
subjects retrieved the marshmallow reward when balanced 
stones resting on top of the apparatus accidentally fell into 
the tube. In final trials, only two males (captive-born lit-
termates: Raccoon 29 and Raccoon 40) retrieved the reward 
by picking up and dropping stones in the apparatus. Another 
captive-born female (Raccoon 22) also began dropping 
stones into the apparatus; however, she never extended her 
arm far enough into the tube to retrieve the reward, despite 
the reward being well within reach. During final trials, Rac-
coon 22 innovated a unique solution by gripping the inner 
rim of the apparatus with her forepaws and, while rocking 
her body back and forth, overturned the entire apparatus and 
retrieved the reward (see video Online Resource 5).
Fig. 1  Image of Raccoon 40 solving the Aesop’s Fable task. (1) The raccoon collected stones, (2) placed them onto the rim and pushed them 
into the tube, and (3) reached into the tube with one arm and grabbed the marshmallow reward
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Model selection was based on Akaike’s information cri-
terion corrected for small sample sizes. Our top model for 
changes in work time revealed that there was an interac-
tion effect between subject ID and trial number (see ESM 
Table  1), and learning curves for each successful rac-
coon revealed different patterns. We found that work time 
decreased across trials for Raccoon 29, increased across tri-
als for Raccoon 40, and remained consistent across trials for 
Raccoon 22 (see ESM Fig. 2). Likewise, our top exploratory 
diversity model (see ESM Table 1) indicated that the propor-
tion of useful behaviors expressed improved across trials 
for Raccoons 29 and 40, whereas Raccoon 22 did not show 
improvement (see ESM Fig. 3).
Only Raccoons 29 and 40 progressed into Phase II based 
on their ability to drop stones into the apparatus to retrieve 
the reward. Our top models for each of the three choice 
tasks indicated that Raccoons 29 and 40 did not differ in 
performance, and their performance did not change as they 
gained experience with each of the choice tasks (see ESM 
Table 1). Exact binomial tests indicated there was no prefer-
ence in the first choice made in each trial across tasks for 
either raccoon (P ≥ 0.07 for all tasks). Overall, they did 
not show a preference for the large, more functional stones 
rather than the small, less functional stones in the size task 
(Raccoon 29: 46% correct drops, binomial test, P = 0.71; 
Raccoon 40: 52% correct drops, binomial test, P = 0.50; 
see ESM Fig. 4). In the substrate task, Raccoon 29 showed 
a preference for dropping stones into the water tube (77% 
correct drops, binomial test, P < 0.0001), but Raccoon 40 
did not (50% correct drops, binomial test, P = 0.56; see 
ESM Fig. 5). However, when Trials 4 and 11 were removed 
from analysis (i.e., trials where Raccoon 40 stood on top of 
the corncob-filled tube and repeatedly dropped and removed 
the same stone multiple times), Raccoon 40 also showed a 
preference for the water-filled tube (75% correct drops, bino-
mial test, P = 0.01). In the density task, the raccoons did not 
show a preference for the sinking balls over the floating balls 
(Raccoon 29: 44% correct drops, binomial test, P = 0.86; 
Raccoon 40: 50% correct of drops, binomial test, P = 0.95; 
see ESM Fig. 6). Unexpectedly, both raccoons increased the 
functionality of the floating balls by pushing down on them 
repeatedly in the tube, splashing small bits of marshmallow 
upward. In the tool use task, both raccoons failed to retrieve 
the reward using the cup in a continuous scooping motion. In 
one trial each, however, the raccoons captured marshmallow 
pieces by dropping the cup into the tube and quickly retriev-
ing it before it sank (see video Online Resource 4).
Discussion
Our application of the Aesop’s Fable paradigm not only 
in a new species, the raccoon, but in a new order, the 
Carnivora, is an important first step in expanding the 
investigation of causal understanding. We found that rac-
coons did not spontaneously drop stones into a tube of 
water to retrieve a floating reward, however, Raccoons 29 
and 40 learned to drop stones into the tube and Raccoon 22 
innovated a different, novel solution. Although participa-
tion and learning by Raccoons 29 and 40 confirmed our 
first prediction that it is possible to engage raccoons in the 
Aesop’s Fable paradigm, we successfully trained only two 
of eight subjects, which is less than that of other Aesop’s 
Fable studies (e.g., 50% of subjects, Logan et al. 2016; 
~80% of subjects, Cheke et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011). 
Despite seven of our eight subjects engaging with the task, 
our reduced training success could be explained by our 
inability to implement a distinct habituation period and/
or additional training trials, as is common in the Aesop’s 
Fable paradigm (Jelbert et al. 2015; Miller et al. 2016). It 
is possible that the interest and success of our top three 
participants are related to their captive-rearing background 
(see Thornton and Lukas 2012); however, we could not 
test for an effect of background statistically because of 
our low sample size.
Raccoon morphology allowed our subjects to pick up 
multiple objects at one time, which is similar to the abili-
ties of primates but unlike the more limited abilities of 
birds to manipulate objects (Cheke et al. 2012). In the 
size and density tasks, it was common for raccoons to 
collect whichever stones and objects were closest as they 
approached the apparatus, place them on the rim, and 
move them around until one (or more) fell into the tube. As 
proposed by Cheke et al. (2012), the crowding of multiple 
stones and objects when falling into the tube could have 
negatively affected the ability of the raccoons to observe 
which were most effective and learn the differences in the 
functionality among all options. Raccoons did show a pref-
erence for the water tube during the substrate task, yet, 
unlike studies in birds and children (see Jelbert et al. 2015 
for discussion), trial number did not seem to affect their 
choices. We therefore believe raccoons either learned the 
functionality of the water tube quickly because this task 
offered the most dichotomous choices, or that raccoons 
were biased toward the water tube because they had previ-
ous experience working with it. Similar biases have been 
proposed in the “object bias” hypothesis (Jelbert et al. 
2015) and reported by Miller et al. (2016). In the tool use 
task, raccoons did not use the cup in a scooping motion to 
retrieve the reward. Although the proper scooping tech-
nique could have required extended time to develop, we do 
believe that raccoons would have been physically capable 
of completing this task based on the handling abilities we 
observed. Nevertheless, raccoons were able to retrieve the 
reward by quickly recovering the cup before it sank.
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Future considerations
Although Aesop’s Fable has a strong potential for inter-spe-
cies comparisons (Jelbert et al. 2014; Logan et al. 2014), our 
experience using this paradigm revealed challenges when 
adapting it for a species that is morphologically and behav-
iorally different from those previously tested. For example, 
in following the traditional design of an Aesop’s Fable appa-
ratus, one important consideration was to accommodate the 
lengthy arms and small forepaws of raccoons by increasing 
the height of the tube. This height required vigorous involve-
ment on the part of the subjects; raccoons either needed to 
stand tall on their toes or climb on top of the apparatus and 
then push their entire arm into the tube to reach the reward. 
Ultimately, the unwillingness of Raccoon 22 to fully extend 
her arm into the tube prevented her advancement to Phase 
II. The intentionally narrow diameter of the tube also made 
it difficult for raccoons to readily drop stones into the tube, 
and instead they had to align the stones appropriately for 
insertion, which could explain the abnormal learning curve 
of Raccoon 40 (see ESM for a brief discussion). To improve 
the traditional design for species with long forelimbs, we 
recommend the development of new apparatuses that incor-
porate water displacement, rather than a column of water.
The exploratory, tactile nature of raccoons may have con-
founded their performance in the Aesop’s Fable paradigm. 
For example, during Phase II the behavior of Raccoons 
29 and 40 did not seem to be goal-oriented, in the sense 
described in many other Aesop’s Fable studies (e.g., Bird 
and Emery 2009). That is, they did not drop the exact num-
ber of stones necessary to retrieve the reward and continued 
dropping stones and exploring experimental materials after 
the reward had been retrieved. We recorded many instances 
where the raccoons washed the stones/objects in their water 
dish, buried the stones/objects in their litter box, carried the 
stones/objects into their den box, and seemingly played with 
the stones/objects for long periods of time. These observa-
tions are reminiscent of the Brelands’ well-known attempt 
to train a raccoon to drop coins into a piggy bank (Breland 
and Breland 1961). The authors attributed the unsuccessful 
performance of their subject to “instinctual drift,” whereby 
the raccoon’s natural inclination to handle coins inhibited its 
ability to let go of them, even for a food reward. Raccoons 
29 and 40 did not share this same rigid “misbehavior,” as 
they readily dropped stones and objects into the tube. How-
ever, their tactile, instinctual tendencies likely affected the 
unique ways in which raccoons interacted with materials in 
this task. Thus, similar species-specific behaviors and sen-
sory mechanisms should be considered in future adaptations 
of the Aesop’s Fable paradigm, including interpretation of 
results.
Because our experiments were limited by time constraints 
and a relatively small sample size, the depth at which our 
raccoon subjects understood the causal properties of this 
task remains uncertain and thus should be interpreted with 
caution. Yet we observed an expression of diverse, investiga-
tive behaviors that have not been previously reported in other 
Aesop’s Fable experiments, and can, in part, explain rac-
coon performance in this paradigm. Perhaps animals such as 
raccoons, whose dexterity allows for increased engagement 
with their environment, require more time to fully investi-
gate the physical features of a task to develop a preference 
than less dexterous species. Alternatively, it may be best to 
present such animals with more functionally dichotomous 
choices to elicit a strong preference. Nevertheless, applying 
the Aesop’s Fable paradigm to raccoons has reaffirmed the 
innovativeness of raccoons as study subjects and highlighted 
important considerations when using the Aesop’s Fable par-
adigm to assess causal understanding across diverse taxa in 
the future.
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